2004 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

10-13-2004

Mark I Restoration v. Assurance Co of Amer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004

Recommended Citation
"Mark I Restoration v. Assurance Co of Amer" (2004). 2004 Decisions. 236.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/236

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2004 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 03-2070

MARK I RESTORATION SVC,
Appellant
v.
ASSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-03729)
District Judge: Hon. Cynthia M. Rufe

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, VAN ANTWERPEN and COW EN, Circuit Judges
(Filed October 13, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Mark I Restoration SVC appeals from the District Court’s order
dismissing with prejudice its complaint against the Assurance Company of America for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
The case at bar stems from an underlying action filed by Christine Broadwell
against Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Work Restoration, Incorporated
in a Pennsylvania state court. After Broadwell’s home was purportedly damaged through
skunk infestation, she made a claim for coverage to Nationwide. In response, Nationwide
hired Work Restoration to deodorize and remediate Broadwell’s home. In turn, Work
Restoration subcontracted portions of this work to Mark I. In her complaint, Broadwell
alleged that Work Restoration misused chemicals thereby causing her bodily injury.
By way of a third party complaint, Work Restoration joined Mark I as a defendant
to Broadwell’s suit, alleging that Mark I introduced certain chemicals and deodorizers
while performing work in Broadwell’s residence. Work Restoration averred that if it
were ultimately found liable for Broadwell’s injuries, Mark I would be liable to it for
contribution and indemnification.
At all times relevant to this action, Mark I was insured under a liability policy
issued by Assurance. Pursuant to this policy, Mark I sought coverage for Work
1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332; this court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

Restoration’s claims. Assurance refused to provide Mark I with a legal defense, citing
the “pollution exclusion clause” in the policy.
After successfully defending against Work Restoration’s third party complaint in
state court, Mark I filed a complaint against Assurance in federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction, seeking a declaratory judgment and alleging bad faith. The District
Court granted Assurance’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Mark I
Restoration SVC v. Assurance Co. of America, 248 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
This timely appeal followed.
II.
This court reviews a district court’s resolution of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim de novo.

A dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if it

“appears beyond doubt that [the complainant] can prove no set of facts in support of [its]
claim which would entitle [it] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
We must apply Pennsylvania law.
In Count I of its complaint, Mark I sought a declaratory judgment that Assurance
had a duty to defend it against Work Restoration’s complaint. It has long been the law in
Pennsylvania that the nature of the allegations contained in a complaint filed against a
policyholder control whether an insurer must provide a defense. Roman Mosaic & Tile
Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa. Super. Ct.1997). Stated otherwise,
“[i]t is not the actual details of the injury, but the nature of the claim which determines
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whether the insurer is required to defend.” Springfield Township v. Indem. Ins. Co. of
North Am., 64 A.2d 761, 762 (Pa. 1949). Thus, a court determines an insurer’s duty to
defend by analyzing the factual allegations in the complaint pending against the insured
and determining whether those allegations state a claim conceivably falling within the
coverage of the controlling policy. Mutual Benefit Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745
(Pa.1999).
In dismissing Mark I’s complaint, the District Court held that a “pollution
exclusion” clause contained in the controlling policy absolved Assurance of a duty to
defend. Under this clause, coverage does not extend to lawsuits complaining of
“‘[b]odily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants.” App. at 108.
The policy defines “pollutants” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or
contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.”
App. at 105.
Mark I sets forth two arguments as to why the District Court erred. First, Mark I
contends that, the pollution exclusion aside, Assurance had a duty to defend because
Work Restoration’s complaint contained allegations apart from those related to the
application of potential “pollutants.” Second, addressing the pollution exclusion clause
directly, Mark I argues that the clause is ambiguous and therefore must be construed
against Assurance.
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A.

The Scope of Work Restoration’s Allegations Apart from the Pollution
Exclusion

Mark I maintains that certain of the claims pending against it sounded in theories
that did not involve the negligent introduction of potential “pollutants” and, therefore,
regardless of the pollution exclusion, the District Court’s ruling was in error. See
Nationwide Mut. Fire Co. v. Shank, 951 F. Supp. 68, 71 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Work
Restoration’s third party complaint alleged that Mark I:
[P]erformed work at [Broadwell’s] residence and introduced certain
chemicals, deodorizers, odor eliminators, and/or other foreign substances in
an attempt to eliminate [Broadwell’s] house odor problems . . . . If
[Broadwell’s] claims are proven . . . then the same arose in whole or in part
by the negligent acts or omissions of . . . Mark I . . . including but not
limited to the application, spraying and dispersal of chemicals, deodorizers,
odor eliminators, and/or other foreign substances.
App. at 262-63 (emphasis added). Mark I further notes that Broadwell’s underlying
complaint alleged that Work Restoration failed to train and properly supervise its agents
and employees and that it failed properly to warn Broadwell – allegations sounding in
theories broader than the negligent use of purported pollutants. Citing the “including but
not limited to” language of the third party complaint, Mark I maintains that Work
Restoration incorporated against it the full panoply of the allegations contained in the
Broadwell complaint, thereby incorporating allegations in addition to the purported
spraying or dispersal of “pollutants.”
However, as the District Court correctly held, W ork Restoration’s complaint did
not incorporate against Mark I the allegations of the Broadwell complaint. Mark I
5

Restoration SVC, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 401; see also Pa. R. Civ. P. 1019(g).2 Moreover,
even if the allegations of the Broadwell complaint were somehow incorporated against
Mark I, all of Broadwell’s claims “rest upon the fundamental averment” that Broadwell
suffered personal injury due to her exposure to potential “pollutants” and therefore,
regardless of the precise legal theory the allegations may take, they undoubtedly implicate
the pollution exclusion clause. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735
A.2d 100, 109-10 (Pa. 1999). Under the controlling policy, coverage does not extend to
any personal injuries “arising out of” the dispersal of pollutants. Thus, even though
certain of Broadwell’s allegations sounded in theories such as failure to warn or failure to
train, the injuries Broadwell allegedly suffered thereby certainly “ar[ose] out of” the
dispersal of potential “pollutants.” Id. At bottom then, even if W ork Restoration’s third
party complaint did incorporate against Mark I the broader negligence allegations of the
Broadwell complaint, those broader theories nonetheless implicated the pollution
exclusion clause.
B.

Whether the Pollution Exclusion Clause is Ambiguous

Next, addressing the pollution exclusion clause directly, Mark I argues that the

2

Mark I’s reliance on Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c), which pertains to “Adoption by
Reference” and “Exhibits,” is misplaced because Work Restoration’s third-party
complaint and the underlying Broadwell complaint were filed and prosecuted in
Pennsylvania state court. Thus, whether Work Restoration’s third-party complaint
incorporated by reference the Broadwell complaint and thereby triggered in Assurance the
duty to defend were questions controlled by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,
specifically Pa. R. Civ. P. 1019, rather than by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
6

clause is ambiguous and therefore unenforceable as applied to the allegations contained in
Work Restoration’s third party complaint. Specifically, Mark I argues that the materials
that Work Restoration alleged that it sprayed and dispersed are not clearly identified in
the complaint and may have been innocuous items, thereby presenting an ambiguity as to
whether those items are “pollutants” as defined by the policy.
Terms in an insurance contract are “ambiguous if they are subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.” Wagner v. Erie Ins.
Co., 801 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 2004) (mem.).
Thus, the question of ambiguity is “not . . . to be resolved in a vacuum.” Madison Const.
Co., 735 A.2d at 106. Rather, this court must analyze the disputed policy terms in the
context of the facts alleged in the complaint filed against Mark I.
Again, the policy defines pollutants as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal
irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
waste.” App. at 105. Taken in context, and with reference “to a particular set of facts,”
Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 107, this language is not ambiguous. Work
Restoration’s complaint alleged that Mark I introduced “chemicals, deodorizers, odor
eliminators, and/or other foreign substances” at the Broadwell residence. App. at 262.
Although the terms “chemicals, deodorizers, odor eliminators, and/or other foreign
substances,” are conceptually quite broad and certainly may, in theory, include benign
substances rather than “pollutants,” the specific nature of the claim alleged against Mark I
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prevents this court from engaging in such untethered speculation. Rather, as used in the
third party complaint, the terms “chemicals, deodorizers, odor eliminators, and/or other
foreign substances” unambiguously refer to the “‘irritant[s] or contaminant[s]’” described
as “pollutants” in the policy.
To be sure, Work Restoration’s third party complaint does not identify the specific
product or products that it alleges Mark I to have introduced into the Broadwell home.
Mark I argues that, because of this lack of identification, one cannot know whether such
substances qualify as “pollutants” under the Assurance Policy. In support of this
proposition, Mark I references the following language from the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania:
We determine first whether the policy’s definition of “pollutant” applies
unambiguously to the floor sealant or curing compound known as Euco
Floor Coat. The pertinent inquiry is not, as Madison contends, whether the
policy’s definition of “pollutant” is so broad that virtually any substance,
including many useful and necessary products, could be said to come within
its ambit. Rather, guided by the principle that ambiguity (or the lack
thereof) is to be determined by reference to a particular set of facts, we
focus on the specific product at issue.
Madison Const. Co., 735 A.2d at 107 (emphasis added). Mark I reads this passage as
establishing a rule that unidentified substances necessarily cannot constitute pollutants
under pollution exclusion clauses. We cannot accept Mark I’s interpretation.
The Madison Const. Co. court’s admonition to “focus on the specific product at
issue” was a response to the insured’s argument that the definition of “pollutant” in the
insurance policy at issue was ambiguous because it was conceptually broad enough to
8

encompass virtually any substance. The passage quoted above was merely included to
reenforce the court’s principal holding that policy language must be construed in
perspective of the particular facts implicated. The court did not, contrary to Mark I’s
argument, establish a per se rule that unidentified substances cannot be pollutants. We
are confident, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, if confronted with the
pollution exclusion clause in the context of Work Restoration’s allegations against Mark
I, would find the clause unambiguous notwithstanding the fact that the third party
complaint fails to identify the at-issue substances with any additional particularity. See
McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv., 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that federal court
sitting in diversity must predict how highest state court would rule on issue presented).
III.
Finally, in Count II of its complaint, Mark I alleged that, in refusing to defend
against Work Restoration’s third party complaint, Assurance acted in bad faith and
thereby violated 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371. Liability under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371
requires a showing that the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits and that
the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis for denial.
Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
Here, Mark I alleges that Assurance breached its duty to act in good faith by denying
coverage and by not conducting an adequate and reasonable investigation of the claim.
Mark I’s arguments, however, are contrary to law.
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As this court has previously noted, where there is no duty to defend an insured
against a suit, the insurer obviously has good cause to decline to defend. Frog, Switch, &
Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 751 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999). As explained
above, Assurance had no duty to defend Mark I against Work Restoration’s third party
complaint. Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, an insurance company has no
responsibility to investigate beyond the four corners of the complaint. Scopel v. Donegal
Mut. Ins. Co., 698 A.2d 602, 607 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
IV.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Mark I’s
complaint for failure to state a claim. Moreover, because any attempt to amend would
have been futile, the District Court’s “with prejudice” dismissal was not error. Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
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